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CONSTRICTING PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
REFORMS IN THEORY AND PROCEDURE
FRANK J. VANDALL*
I. INTRODUCTIONRECENT reforms in theory and procedure have changed the way vic-
tims' attorneys view products cases. Once the poster-child for judicial
activism, products liability litigation has been dismantled piece by piece.
These broad-spectrum reforms dramatically affect practically every facet of
a modern products case, from the need for an expert witness to the
amount of damages recoverable. Numerous articles have chronicled the
150-year expansion of products theory.1 The task of this Article is to mani-
fest that large numbers of theoretical and procedural reforms have dra-
matically affected the value of the case. Today the victim's attorney must
reject all but the largest and most profitable cases. 2
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1964, Washington
andJefferson College;J.D. 1967, Vanderbilt University School of Law; L.L.M. 1968,
S.J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin Law School. I appreciate the research
assistance of Stuart Mones. Mistakes are mine, however.
1. See generally MaryJ. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1075 (1996) (noting expansive shifts in products liability
theory and acknowledging Supreme Court's role in these developments); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992) (recognizing that vast
amounts of literature have been devoted to field of products liability, focusing spe-
cifically on Section 402A of Second Restatement). Professor Davis wrote:
Although the debate over how to resolve product-related injuries heated
up in the early 1960s and has continued over the ensuing three decades
to this day, the Court did not decide a products liability case until 1986.
In [East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerican Delaval, Inc.]....
Davis, supra, at 1081. The editorial summary provides:
In this article, Professor Davis chronicles the Supreme Court's expansion
of the "culture of irresponsibility," where institutional defendants are
freed from tort liability with no check on the abuse of such immunity.
Professor Davis describes the Court's progression toward immunity in
products liability decisions of the past decade including East River Steam-
ship, Boyle, Cipollone, and Lohr .... Limiting the manufacturer's duty
in such broad terms downplays the effort of the previous twenty years to
put products liability into the tort arena, not out of it.
Id. at 1075, 1085-86; see also FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 1-10 (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1989) (providing historical perspec-
tive of strict liability theory); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products
Liability: The ALl Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 636-42 (1995) (discussing
ideas and theories that historically supported product restatements).
2. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1512-14 (discussing revisions to
Section 402A of Second Restatement). Prior to drafting the Restatement (Third) of
Products, Professors Henderson and Twerski reflected on recent developments in
products law:
(843)
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Only rarely do provisions of the American Law Institute's Restatements of
the Law rise to the dignity of holy writ. Even more rarely do individual
comments to Restatement sections come to symbolize important, decisive
developments that dominate judicial thinking. Nevertheless, Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is such a provision. Literally
thousands upon thousands of products liability decisions in the past
twenty-five years have explicitly referred to, and come to grips with, that
section. Among products liability followers one need only identify an is-
sue as presenting "a comment k problem," or to identify a legislative pro-
posal as "a comment i provision," to capture instantly the essence of the
relevant debate and incorporate nearly thirty years of legal controversy,
development and refinement.
Given that Section 402A has achieved the status of sacred scripture,
our proposal to replace it with new text and new comments may strike
some readers as blasphemous. What prompts such audacity? Quite sim-
ply, doctrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy
gloss on the original text of and comments to Section 402A as to render
them anachronistic and at odds with their currently discerned objectives.
By changing the relevant language to conform to current understand-
ings-by restating the Restatement-we hope to clarify much of the confu-
sion that has arisen over the years.
Only recently, while working on this Article, we learned that the
American Law Institute itself has decided that the products liability sec-
tions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, including Section 402A, needs
revision.... [W]e have sought to approach the revision of Section 402A
cautiously, treating existing language and concepts with considerable re-
spect. Language that has been interpreted by so many courts over such a
substantial period of time cannot be cavalierly discarded. At the same
time issues that once posed burning questions have now been well settled
and new areas of controversy dominate the landscape. We have thus cho-
sen a moderate approach in drafting our suggested revision. We intend
to stay as close as possible to shared perceptions of the evolved meanings
of the original section and its comments. We do not fancy ourselves as
radical reformers, although we express preferences, based on widely rec-
ognized normative criteria, where choices are appropriate. Finally, we
propose to identify those areas in which true controversy reigns and in
which neither predictions nor recommendations are in order.
Id. A recent student note summarized the law by stating:
Over the past thirty years, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
has defined American products liability law. Under Section 402A, a man-
ufacturer or distributor is held strictly liable if a product is "unreasonably
dangerous" and "defective." This determination depends upon whether
the product is in a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer." Although most states adopted this formulation either judicially
or through legislative enactment, its relevance and application to modern
situations has steadily declined. In particular, Section 402A's failure to
distinguish between claims involving manufacturing, design, and warning
defects required courts to devise appropriate standards for all three types
of defects. This dissonance played a key role in the A.L.I.'s decision to
open its Iestatement (Third) of Torts with a restatement of products liability
law.
Traditionally, determining design fitness has presented the most
"agitated and controversial" problems in products liability law. Unlike
cases involving manufacturing flaws, where courts can evaluate the chal-
lenged product against the manufacturer's own production standards as
manifested by other units in the production line, cases of alleged design
defect, where the product is in its intended condition, do not provide a
2
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Products liability law began in 1836 in the case of Langridge v. Levy.3
In Langridge, a father purchased a rifle for his son, who was subse-
quently severely injured while using the gun. The court held the seller
of the gun liable in fraud.4  Later, in 1850, the concept of privity
built-in objective standard of comparison. In design cases the courts
themselves must provide an external standard or norm of defectiveness,
which requires them to weigh various engineering, marketing, and finan-
cial factors. In observing the courts' struggle in analyzing such cases, one
commentator noted that "it may now be true that [design] defect, like
obscenity in Justice Stewart's definition, will be discovered by sense im-
pression. Unfortunately 'I know it when I see it' will not suffice as ajudi-
cial standard for products liability."
MichaelJ. Toke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness in American
Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 239, 239-41 (1996) (analyzing
key aspects of products liability law).
3. 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 864 (1836). The facts in Langridge were as follows:
At the trial before Alderson, B., at the Somersetshire Summer Assizes,
1836, it appeared that in June, 1833, the plaintiff's father saw in the shop
of the defendant, a gun-maker in Bristol, a double-barrelled gun, to
which was attached a ticket in these terms:-"Warranted, this elegant
twist gun, by Nock, with case complete, made for his late Majesty George
IV.; cost 60 guineas: only 25 guineas." He went into the shop, and saw the
defendant, and examined the gun. The defendant (according to Lan-
gridge's statement) said he would warrant the gun to have been made by
Nock for King George IV, and that he could produce Nock's invoice.
Langridge told the defendant he wanted the gun for the use of himself
and his sons, and desired him to send it to his house at Knowle, about two
miles from Bristol, that they might see it tried. On the next day, accord-
ingly, the defendant sent the gun to Langridge's house by his shopman,
who also on that occasion warranted it to be made by Nock, and charged
and fired it off several times. Langridge ultimately bought it of him for
241, and paid the price down. Langridge the father and his three sons
used the gun occasionally; and in the month of December following, the
plaintiff, his second son, having taken the gun into a field near his fa-
ther's house to shoot some birds, putting in an ordinary charge, on firing
off the second barrel, it exploded and mutilated his left hand so severely
as to render it necessary that it should be amputated. There was conflict-
ing evidence as to the fact of the gun's being an insecure one, or inferior
workmanship. Mr. Nock, however, proved that it was not manufactured
by him. The defendant also denied that any warranty had been given.
The learned Judge left the jury to say, first, whether the defendant had
warranted the gun to be made by Nock, and to be a safe and secure one;
secondly, whether it was in fact unsafe or of inferior materials or work-
manship and exploded in consequence of being so; and thirdly, whether
the defendant warranted it to be a safe gun, knowing that it was not so.
The jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff, damages 4001.
Id. at 864.
4. See id. (reciting holding). The court held:
If the instrument in question, which is not of itself dangerous, but which
reqtires an act to be done, that is, to be loaded, in order to make it so,
had been simply delivered by the defendant, without any contract or rep-
resentation on his part, to the plaintiff, no action would have been main-
tainable for any subsequent damage which the plaintiff might have
sustained by the use of it. But if it had been delivered by the defendant to
the plaintiff, for the purpose of being so used by him, with an accompany-
ing representation to him that he might safely so use it, and that repre-
3
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emerged. 5 This meant that in order to bring suit, a plaintiff must be in
contract with the defendant and, if the person bringing the suit was not in
contract, he or she could not sue. Shortly after privity appeared, the
courts began to develop legal fictions in order to skirt the privity concept.
6
sentation had been false to the defendant's knowledge, and the plaintiff
had acted upon the faith of its being true, and had received damage
thereby, then there is no question but that an action would have lain,
upon the principle of a numerous class of cases, of which the leading one
is that of Pasley v. Freeman (3 T.R. 51); which principle is, that a mere
naked falsehood is not enough to give a right of action; but if it be a
falsehood told with an intention that it should be acted upon by the party
injured, and that act must produce damage to him; if, instead of being
delivered to the plaintiff immediately, the instrument had been placed in
the hands of a third person, for the purpose of being delivered to and
then used by the plaintiff, the like false representation being knowingly
made to the intermediate person to be communicated to the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff had acted upon it, there can be no doubt but that the
principle would equally apply and the plaintiff would have had his rem-
edy for the deceit .... We therefore think, that as there is fraud, and
damage, the result of that fraud, not from an act remote and consequent-
ial, but one contemplated by the defendant at the time as one of its re-
sults, the party guilty of the fraud is responsible to the party injured.
Id. at 868.
5. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842) (adopting con-
cept of privity first). In Winterbotton, an injured mailcoach driver stied the person
who had a contract to repair the mailcoaches. In rejecting the driver's claim the
court reasoned:
The contract in this case was made with the Postmaster-General alone;
and the case is just the same as if he had come to the defendant and
ordered a carriage, and handed it at once over to Atkinson. If we were to
hold that the plaintiff could site in such a case, there is no point at which
such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to
recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond
that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty. The only real argt-
ment in favour of the action is, that this is a case of hardship; but that
might have been obviated, if the plaintiff had made himself a party to the
contract. Then it is urged that it falls within the principle of the case of
Levy v. Langridge. But the principle of that case was simply this, that the
father having bought the gun for the very purpose of being used by the
plaintiff, the defendant made representations by which he was induced to
use it. There a distinct fraud was committed on the plaintiff; the false-
hood of the representation was also alleged to have been within the
knowledge of the defendant who made it, and he was properly held liable
for the consequences. How are the facts of that case applicable to those
of the present? Where is the allegation of misrepresentation or fraud in
this declaration? It shews nothing of the kind. Our judgment must
therefore be for the defendant.
Id.
6. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903)
(relying on legal fictions to avoid privity requirement). In Huset, the court stated
three exceptions [fictions] to the privity rule:
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is
imminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is
committed in the preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve,
destroy, or affect human life, is actionable by third parties who suffer
from the negligence.... The leading case upon this subject is Thomas v.
4
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A fiction is a statement that something is true when, in fact, it is false. 7
These fictions included fraud, invitation, extra-hazardous or extraordina-
rily dangerous products and abnormally dangerous products.8 The fic-
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455.... In all these cases of sale the
natural and probable result of the act of negligence-nay, the inevitable
result of it-was not an injury to the party to whom the sales were made,
but to those who, after the purchasers had disposed of the articles, should
consume them. Hence these cases stand upon two well-established prin-
ciples of law: (1) That every one is bound to avoid acts or omissions immi-
nently dangerous to the lives of others, and (2) that an injury which is the
natural and probable result of an act of negligence is actionable. It was
the natural and probable result of the negligence in these cases that the
vendees would not suffer, but that those who subsequently purchased the
deleterious articles would sustain the injuries resulting from the negli-
gence of the manufacturers or dealers who furnished them.
The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which
causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance
upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an action against the
owner. Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124, 15 Am. Rep. 387....
The third exception to the rule is that one who sells or delivers an
article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to
another without notice of its qualities is liable to any person who suffers
an injury there from which might have been reasonably anticipated,
whether there were any contractual relations between the parties or not.
Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 4 M. & W. 337 ....
Id. at 870-71.
7. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (7th ed. 1990) (defining legal fiction as
"situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter").
8. See generally Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874) (noting that
owner of building who negligently constructs scaffold which results in injury to
contracted employee is example of "invitation exception"); Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (recognizing that druggist who sold deadly poison, which had
been mislabeled "extract of dandelion," was example of "inherently dangerous
product exception"); Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep at 834 (stating that gun dealer who
sold gun and represented it to be safe, but which resulted in injury to purchaser's
son upon firing, was example of "misrepresentation exception"). The facts of
Winchester were as follows:
Action in the supreme court, commenced in August, 1849, against
Winchester and Gilbert, for injuries sustained by Mrs. Thomas, from the
effects of a quantity of extract of belladonna, administered to her by mis-
take as extract of dandelion....
RUGGLES, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court. This is an ac-
tion brought to recover damages from the defendant for negligently put-
ting up, labeling and selling as and for the extract of dandelion, which is a
simple and harmless medicine, ajar of the extract of belladonna, which is
a deadly poison; by means of which the plaintiff Mary Ann Thomas, to
whom, being sick, a dose of dandelion was prescribed by a physician, and
a portion of the contents of the jar, was administered as and for the ex-
tract of dandelion, was greatly injured.
The facts proved were briefly these: Mrs. Thomas being in ill health,
her physician prescribed for her a dose of dandelion. Her husband pur-
chased what was believed to be the medicine prescribed, at the store of
Dr. Foord, a physician and druggist in Cazenovia, Madison County, where
the plaintiffs reside. ...
The defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs. Gilbert was his
agent in preparing them for market. The death or great bodily harm of
20031
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tions allowed the courts to avoid the concept of privity when they felt that
it would accomplish justice.t ' The impact of the fiction was that a person
not in privity was able to sue and recover against the seller of the
product. 10
The case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. I is a watershed. It marks
the end of the doctrine of privity and a shift to the concept of negligence
in products litigation. 12 In MacPherson, an individual purchased a Buick
some person was the natural and almost inevitable consequence of the
sale of belladonna by means of the false label....
The defendant's negligence put human life in imminent danger.
Can it be said that there was no duty on the part of the defendant to
avoid the creation of that danger by the exercise of greater caution?
Winchester, 6 N.Y. at 397, 405-09.
9. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (acknowl-
edging legal fictions to arrive at just results). The facts in MacPherson were:
The defendant is a manufacturer of automobiles. It sold an automobile
to a retail dealer. The retail dealer resold to the plaintiff. While the
plaintiff was in the car it suddenly collapsed. He was thrown out and
injured. One of the wheels was made of defective wood, and its spokes
crumbled into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant; it
was bought from another manufacturer. There is evidence, however, that
its defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and that
inspection was omitted. There is no claim that the defendant knew of the
defect and willfully concealed it. The case, in other words, is not brought
within the rule of Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098, 2
L.R.A., N.S., 3030, 111 Am.St.Rep. 691, 5 Ann.Cas. 124. The charge is
one, not of fraud, but of negligence. The question to be determined is
whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but
the immediate purchaser.
Id. at 1051. Cardozo, writing for the majority, held:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to
poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their
normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing
is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of
the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
That is as far as we are required to go for the decision of this case. There
must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable....
We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished
product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his
customers. If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability
will follow.
Id. at 1053.
10. SeeGreenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-02 (Cal. 1963)
(recognizing viability of claim of plaintiff injured while using power tool given to
him by his wife).
11. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
12. See id. at 1051-53 (discussing concept of negligence as it relates to product
liability and noting that manufacturers of dangerous products are tinder duty of
care to make products carefully).
[Vol. 48: p. 843
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and was injured when the wooden wheel collapsed. 13 Suit against the
manufacturer was barred by privity in the trial court, but the New York
Court of Appeals cast aside the doctrine of privity and held that when a
product becomes dangerous because it was not made carefully, the injured
person may sue the manufacturer. A careful reading of the case makes
clear that the fictions had expanded to such an extent that they had con-
sumed the privity rule. 14 MacPherson began a new conceptual level in
products liability, a shift from the technical concept of privity and the ap-
plication of legal fictions, to the more expansive and flexible concept of
negligence.
From 1916 through 1942, the courts applied various theories includ-
ing negligence, fraud, express warranty and implied warranty in products
cases.15 In 1942, the California Supreme Court decided the case of Escola
v. Coca-Cola. 16 In Escola, a waitress was getting a bottle of Coca-Cola out of
a storeroom when it exploded and injured her hand. 17 The majority
rested their decision on res ipsa loquitur, but the critical point of the case
was the concurring opinion byJudge Traynor.18 Res ipsa was sufficient for
her to recover against the Coca-Cola bottler but, Judge Traynor stated in a
concurring opinion, there was a need for strict liability to avoid the
problems of negligence and to more clearly show that the manufacturer
owed a duty to the user of the product.' 9
Traynor's strict liability theory became the rule in Greenman v. Yuba
Power,20 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1963. In that case,
13. See id. at 1051 (reciting facts of case).
14. See id. at 1053-55 (distinguishing facts of case so to expand privity
requirements).
15. See VANDALL, supra note 1, at 43-49 (acknowledging theories courts have
relied on in deciding products liability cases).
16. 150 P.2d 436, 438-40 (Cal. 1944) (stating cause of action by plaintiff, wait-
ress, against Coca-Cola Bottling Company for injuries sustained when bottle con-
taining carbonated beverage exploded).
17. See id. at 438 (describing that when bottle exploded piece of glass "in-
flicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels, nerves and muscles of the
thumb and palm of the hand").
18. See id. at 438-40 (noting that majority opinion was based on theory of res
ipsa loquitur, where defective product speaks for itself in providing inference of
negligence).
19. See id. at 440 ("In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufac-
turer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human beings.") (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916)).
20. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (finding that manufacturer's liability was
governed by strict liability); see also Seeley v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151
(Cal. 1965) (following Greenman by suggesting that imposing strict liability on man-
ufacturers of defective products is equitable because it shifts risk of loss to party
better able to bear loss); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 170-71 (Cal.
1964) (holding retailer strictly liable for putting defective automobiles into stream
of commerce).
7
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the stock flew off a defective lathe and hit the plaintiff in the head.2 1 The
user was not in privity with the manufacturer of the product because the
lathe had been purchased as a gift by the plaintiff's wife. 22 Nevertheless,
the California court adopted the concurring opinion presented by Tray-
nor in Escola over twenty years earlier, and held that the manufacturer of
the product was strictly liable to the consumer.2 3 The plaintiff was thereby
relieved of the heavy burden of proving negligence. 24
Judge Traynor's good friend Dean Prosser was, by this time, teaching
at Hastings College of the Law located only a block from the California
Supreme Court.25 Dean Prosser was the Reporter for the Restatement (Sec-
ond) Section 402(A) in 1964, and made certain that strict liability, set forth
in Greenman, formed the core of the section. 26 Section 402(A)'s greatest
strength is its ambiguity and breadth. It provides that the seller of a defec-
tive product is strictly liable to the consumer or user.2 7 Section 402(A)
precipitated an expansion in the concept of strict liability and protection
for the consumer. 28 Numerous articles and texts have chronicled this de-
velopment. 29 Section 402(A) is the most cited section of any Restate-
ment.-" Following the adoption of Section 402(A), there were
approximately fifteen years of expansion in strict liability and victims' ac-
cess to the courts. The pendulum began to swing back, however. The
retrenchment in products liability began in the early 1980s with state legis-
21. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 898 (discussing plaintiffs injuries).
22. See id. (discussing facts of case).
23. See id. at 901 (providing court's holding).
24. See id. (noting that plaintiff need only prove proper use of machine and
subsequent injury).
25. See Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
(Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39 VAND. L. REv. 851, 852 n.5 (1986) (book
review) (describing Prosser's academic career). After retiring from the University
of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), Dean Prosserjoined the faculty of Hastings
College of the Law in 1963 where he remained until his death in 1972. See id.
(providing details of Prosser's professional endeavors).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt. a (1964) (noting that
402A introduced "special" strict liability rule upon sellers).
27. See id. § 402(A) cmt. g (providing that seller would be held strictly liable
for injuries resulting from defective product).
28. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dan-
gerous Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REX,. 1235, 1241 (1994) (noting that section
402(A) was designed to broaden scope of tort liability).
29. See, e.g., Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 635, 635-36 (1991)
(noting that concept of strict liability has been expanded as cause of action appli-
cable in all cases involving defective products); Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson,
What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3-7 (1991) (denoting development of strict products liability
doctrine).
30. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1512-13 (indicating that Section
402(A) has been cited by "thousands upon thousands of product liability
decisions").
850
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latures passing numerous statutes of repose holding that a products cause
of action could die before the injury even occurred. 3 1
Numerous limitations and inroads into the concept of strict liability
and the proof requirements for a products liability case have led to the
death of cases with a modest expected value. Part II will deal with reforms
in the fundamental products theories. Part III will suggest the various pro-
cedural modifications that impact the presentation of the case in the
courtroom, resulting in attorneys refusing to take modest cases. Several
proposed solutions for victims of products injuries are presented in the
Conclusion.
II. CONSTRICTIONS IN LEGAL THEORY
Perhaps the clearest sign of the shift in theory is the novel Restatement
(Third), Products Liability, Section 2(b).32 This section is important in two
respects. First, it practically eliminates strict liability from the products
area, and second, it requires the plaintiff to show a reasonable alternative
design to the alleged defect in the product. 33 The theoretical, economic
and practical problems with Section 2(b) have been presented in several
articles.34 In every respect, Section 2(b) is injurious to the consumer and
increases the price of products liability suits by the cost of either an expert
witness or the presentation of a reasonable alternative design.3 5 My esti-
mate would be that this is an increase of approximately $25,000 or more
for each case.
31. See Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 593 (1981) (noting that statute of
repose starts clock on plaintiff's potential cause of action at date product is intro-
duced into market, rather than when injury occurs); FrankJ. Vandall, Undermining
Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 30 Am. U. L. REV. 673, 679-86 (1981)
(discussing implementation of various state legislative reforms, including passage
of statutes of repose).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998) (providing most recent
restatement development on strict liability doctrine).
33. See id. (discussing criteria for design defect).
34. See Frank J. Vandall, An Examination of the Duty Issue in Health Care Litiga-
tion: Should HMOs Be Liable in 7ort for "Medical Necessity" Decisions?, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
293, 318 (1998) [hereinafter Vandall, Duty Issue] (indicating that rigid require-
ments imposed upon consumer in 2(b) are not supported by relevant case law);
Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
261, 269-70 (1997) [hereinafter Vandall, Design Defect] (noting that traditional
strict liability principles were ignored in drafting Section 2(b)); FrankJ. Vandall,
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alterna-
tive Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1423 (1994) [hereinafter Vandall,
Reasonable Alternative Design] (arguing that Section 2(b) contravenes traditional
principles of strict liability law).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998) (indicating that in or-
der to prevail in strict liability lawsuit, plaintiff must offer evidence of foregone
reasonable design).
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There have been numerous recent constrictions in strict liability the-
ory, especially in the fundamental concepts of design defect and warn-
ing.3_ 6 The original purpose of strict liability was to benefit the consumer
and prevent him or her from having to prove negligence.3 7 There are
three bases for holding a seller strictly liable. The seller can be held
strictly liable if the product contains a manufacturing defect, a design de-
fect or if the manufacturer fails to provide an appropriate warning.3 8 In
regard to design defect, the courts have moved away from the original
concept of strict liability as developed in Escola, Greenman and the Restate-
ment (Second) Section 402(A). Some courts have shifted to a negligence defi-
nition of design defect.' ! This shift is exemplified by contrasting Barker v.
36. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553
(Cal. 1991) (following design defect test as laid out in Barker); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452-53 (Cal. 1978) (providing that first line of inquiry for design
defects cases is whether product performed as safely as ordinary consumer would
expect if product were used in intended and reasonably foreseeable manner and
second, whether benefits of challenged design outweighed risk of danger inherent
in design).
37. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences."). Traynor went on to comment that:
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless
find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the
responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer,
who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is
responsible for its reaching the market.
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). Traynor's concurrence found it significant that mass
production of most public goods had all but eradicated the close relationship once
held between manufacturer and consumer. See id. (Traynor, J., concurring) ("The
consumer no longer has means or skills enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product .. ").
38. See McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 82 (Wyo. 1989) (Ur-
brigkitJ., dissenting) ("A product may be defective in three ways: (1) manufactur-
ing flaw; (2) defective design; (3) absence or inadequacy of warnings regarding the
use of the product.").
39. See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir.
1986) (relating action for design defect to ordinary negligence). The appellate
court in Chaulk reversed thejudgment of the district court and held that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to a new trial on the issue of negligence regarding mantufac-
turer's faulty design of the latch system on its 1977 Volkswagen Rabbit. See id. at
643 (providing court's holding). This latch system was designed in a manner
which caused it to release on impact from a side collision and, as a result, the
plaintiff was ejected from the car. See id. at 640 (discussing facts of case); see also
Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1399 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that
drug manufacturer was negligent in giving inadequate warnings about product);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 994 (8th Cir. 1969) (finding manufac-
turer liable for failing to use reasonable efforts to warn consumer); DeRosa v. Rem-
ington Arms Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[T]he New York
Court of Appeals has recently made its recognition ... of [the] process ... of a
negligence-type balancing into a cause of action in strict liability for design de-
fect"); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 99, 697 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that negligence is standard for recovery
in failure to warn cases). But see Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the
[Vol. 48: p. 843
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Lull' ° and Anderson v. Owens Coming Fiberglass Corp.41 The tests for strict
liability are all over the map and cover a broad range from pure strict
liability to negligence. 42 The scope of the various definitions is discussed
in detail inJohn Vargo's excellent critique of the Restatement (Third) Section
2(b).4 3 The impact of this shift toward a negligence test for strict liability is
to make it more expensive for a consumer to prove his or her case because
the burden of proving negligence is heavier than that for strict liability.44
In 1981, a New Jersey case held that a failure to provide an adequate
warning would support an action in strict liability. 4 5 A year later, Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.4 6 held that a manufacturer could be strictly
liable for failure to provide a warning even if the manufacturer did not
know of the defect in the product and the need for a warning. Since 1982,
New Jersey, as well as many other states, have tended to move away from
strict liability and have adopted a negligence test for warning.47 Today, a
manufacturer is only held liable for failure to provide an appropriate
warning if it knew or should have known of the defect in the product and
foresaw the need for a warning.48 Professor Ellen Wertheimer makes
Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1185
(1992) (stating that plaintiffs' recovery under strict liability "depends not upon the
manufacturer acting negligently, but upon the manufacturer making the product
and the product causing injury").
40. 573 P.2d at 455 (finding that plaintiff need not prove negligence, but
rather make prima facie showing that injury was caused by defendant's product).
41. 810 P.2d at 558 (holding that manufacturer may present state of art de-
fense in order to defend against strict liability lawsuit).
42. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a "Ner Cloth"for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 536-47 (1996) (providing
jurisdictional interpretations of appropriate strict liability tests).
43. See id. (categorizing various jurisdictional approaches to strict liability
interpretations).
44. See id. at 556 (noting that elimination of consumer expectation test will
force plaintiff to present evidence of reasonable alternative design, which will drive
up cost of case).
45. See, e.g., Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 930-31 (NJ. 1981)
(explaining that in cases involving strict liability knowledge of dangerousness of
product is imputed to defendants, thereby relieving plaintiffs of burden of proving
that defendant knew or should have known of dangerousness of product).
46. 447 A.2d 539, 546-47 (N.J. 1982) (holding that manufacturer's state of art
defense was not applicable).
47. See, e.g., Richter v. Limax Intern, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Kan. 1995)
("Kansas applies the same test to whether a manufacturer met his duty to warn
under negligence as it does under strict liability.").
48. See, e.g., Karjala v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir.
1975) (stating that manufacturer is said to possess skills of expert in field and
thereby has duty to warn of any dangers); Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1106 (5th Cir. 1974) (imposing liability for failure to adequately
warn); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 898-901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972) (indicating that manufacturer's warning regarding product's lack of safety
devices or controls may be found to be inadequate if consumer is likely to disre-
gard warnings); Seley v. G.D. Searle Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ohio 1981) (hold-
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clear in her outstanding article that this is indeed a negligence test for
warning.4 ' The exception to the embrace of negligence is Alaska, which
breathes new life into a warning cause of action based on strict liability. In
the case of Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,50 a pilot committed suicide after taking a
prescription calmative that lacked a warning. The court held that the case
could go to the jury even though it was not clear whether the manufac-
turer knew of the facts that called for a warning.5' The broad adoption of
a negligence definition for warning means that fewer manufacturers will
be held liable in failure to warn cases.5 2
Products liability has also been limited by the dramatic expansion of
the concept of preemption. 53 This theory posits that if there is a federal
statute or regulation providing a standard, it preempts and replaces the
conflicting state law.54 The growth in preemption has been so rapid and
ing that drug manufacturer could not be held strictly liable, despite fact that
ingestion of drug caused plaintiff to have stroke, if drug manufacturer provided
warning with medication that reasonably disclosed to medical profession risks asso-
ciated with use of such medication); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 337
A.2d 893, 902 (Pa. 1975) (noting that adequacy of warning is dependent upon
seriousness of danger and whether or not consumer can reasonably appreciate
that danger).
49. See Wertheimer, supra note 39, at 1202-05 (arguing that failure to warn
doctrine, without imputation of knowledge, is reducible to ordinary negligence on
part of manufacturer).
50. 835 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Alaska 1992) (reciting facts of case).
51. See id. at 1200 (finding thatjury was entitled to hear plaintiffs strict liabil-
ity claim even though plaintiff could not show that defendant knew of danger
posed by product).
52. See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal.
1991) (holding that manufacturer could not be held liable for plaintiff's injuries
unless manufacturer knew at time of manufacture or distribution that its product
was harmful and that it failed to warn consumers of such dangers); Wertheimer,
supra note 39, at 1208 (noting that failure to warn cases present problem for de-
fendants because "a warning is always feasible").
53. See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that if court invokes federal preemption, plaintiff may not have recourse);
see alsoJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 532 (1977) (holding that California
law that conflicted with federal regulations regarding packaging and shipment of
meat was invalid due to doctrine of preemption); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d
736, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that products liability claims against paint
thinner manufacturer were expressly preempted when plaintiff was seeking label
requirements inconsistent with federal regulations); Barbara L. Atwell, Products Li-
ability and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 181, 188-91 (1991)
(concluding that there has been compliance with federal regulation such that state
law claim is preempted and, "there is generally no basis for compensating the vic-
tim..."); Marc S. Klein et al., State Product Liability Law and the "Realpolitik" of Federal
Preemption, CAll ALI-ABA 23, 25 (1995) ("In the past decade, federal preemption
has emerged as a very potent limitation on state product liability law.").
54. See Phillip H. Corby & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Products Liability
Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 435, 448
(1992) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) for proposition that state law
is preempted when it stands in the way of full objectives of Congress); see also Loui-
siana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) ("Pre-emption may
result not only from the action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting
12
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so dramatic that it is possible to suggest to attorneys that practically every
time they find a federal statute or federal regulation that provides a stan-
dard, they may argue, as defense counsel, that this federal standard
preempts any conflicting state statute or common law rule. 55 An example
of federal preemption is automobile airbags, where the federal courts have
struck down state cases that have held that a manufacturer of an automo-
bile was strictly liable if it failed to provide airbags.5 6 The courts have held
that the federal statute, providing the manufacturer with the choice of
either a mechanical seat belt or airbags, was sufficient and that the manu-
facturer could not be held strictly liable if it selected the mechanical "de-
capitator" approach. 57 A second area expanding preemption involves
pesticides. 58 The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) sets up standards for pesticides, and several decisions have held
that these regulations preempt conflicting state decisions.59
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state reg-
ulation."); Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 432 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (finding that federal preemption of matter deprives plaintiff from seeking
redress under state law).
55. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 867-69 (2000)
(holding that federal safety requirements for automobiles preempted plaintiffs
design defect lawsuit based on failure of car manufacturer to install driver's side
airbags). But see Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996) (concluding
that Medical Device Amendments of 1976 do not preempt plaintiff's common law
claims).
56. See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1123 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that state claim that van was defectively designed because it failed to be
equipped with airbags was preempted by federal statute); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am.
Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 928 (Ala. 1989) (holding that National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act preempts any state claims for failure to install airbags); Boyle v.
Chrysler Corp., 501 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (indicating that compli-
ance with federal act preempts state law claims based on absence of airbags).
57. See Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 1988 WL 288972, at *8 (D. Conn.
1988) (holding that National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempts state
law by giving manufacturers options on how to meet safety requirements). In a
crash the shoulder strap often decapitated the driver when he or she forgot to
fasten the lap belt. See Miles v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-99-01258-CV, 2001 WL
727355, at *7 (Tex. App. 2001) (providing factual claims made by plaintiffs that
passive seat belt system had decapitated dummies during institutional motor tests).
58. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated by
505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (holding that Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) preempts any state law claims in regards to warnings); Kennan v.
Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that congres-
sional intent to create comprehensive system for pesticide labeling was adequate to
preempt contradictory state regulations); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F.
Supp. 404, 409 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (denying recovery in tort when federal govern-
ment has preempted state regulation through enactment of FIFRA); Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 936 (Nev. 1992) (ruling that FIFRA implicitly
preempts state tort claims based on failure to adequately label pesticide).
59. See Papas, 926 F.2d at 1023 (providing congressional language banning
contradictory state labeling requirements).
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A third and most important expansion in the concept of preemption
is in the tobacco industry. In the famous Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.6"
case, Rose Cipollone smoked for over 40 years and finally died of lung
cancer. The case spanned seven years of litigation and involved thirteen
federal decisions including two appeals to the United States Supreme
Court. ' The Supreme Court held that, even though there was no express
language in the relevant federal statute, there was express preemption of
the plaintiffs allegation of failure to provide an appropriate warning and
several aspects of design defect.6 2
The plaintiffs attorney in the Cipollone case is rumored to have ex-
pended six million dollars in his suits against the cigarette manufactur-
ers.' !-" The case stands for the rule that if you sue a large manufacturer, it
is going to spend millions of dollars to defend and force you to spend a
like amount.64 In the Cipollone case, Rose Cipollone died, her husband
(the next plaintiff) died, her son then took over the case and finally volun-
tarily discharged the suit.65 The point is that presenting a products liabil-
ity case is often enormously expensive, and if the law is not in the
plaintiff's favor going in (as in Cipollone), the risk of losing is substantial.
In contrast to Cipollone, however, several recent cigarette cases have
been brought based on a theory of fraud.66 In these cases, the attorneys
argued that the cigarette manufacturers defrauded the consumers by sug-
gesting cigarettes were safe and failing to disclose that they knew cigarettes
60. 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992) (discussing facts of case).
61. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S.
504 (1992) (noting that jury's attributing of eighty percent responsibility to Mrs.
Cipollone barred plaintiff's recovery on failure to warn claim).
62. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-30 (holding that federal statute disallowed
plaintiff to claim defect due to manufacturer's failure to provide warning on ciga-
rette carton).
63. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Prod-
ucts Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 58 (1995) (detailing breadth of Cipollone) (citing
HenryJ. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 30).
64. See Stephen Koepp, Tobacco's First Loss: A Landmark Verdict is Likely to Spawn
Many More Suits Against the Industiy, TIME, June 27, 1998, at 50 (reporting that in
recent years cigarette manufacturers are estimated to have spent anywhere be-
tween six hundred million and three billion dollars).
65. See Charles S. Griffith, Ill, Note, The Legacy of the Marlboro Man, 24 N. Ky.
L. REV. 593, 599-600 (1997) (providing background factual information regarding
Cipollone) (citing HenryJ. Reske, Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1993, at 30).
66. See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (providing plaintiff's argument that defendant tobacco manufacturer fraud-
ulently misled public regarding effects of smoking); see also Castano v. Am. To-
bacco Co., 961 F. Supp. 953, 956 (E.D. La. 1997) (noting plaintiffs' contentions
that tobacco manufacturer fraudulently failed to inform consumers of addictive
nature of nicotine).
856 [Vol. 48: p. 843
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were addictive and would kill a certain percentage of the consumers if
used exactly as intended. 67
One of the leading causes of the constricting of products liability the-
ory is the failure of Congress and the state legislatures to deal responsibly
with critical issues in the products area. As with Nero, it is as if the federal
and state legislatures are fiddling as thousands of consumers die. The two
clearest examples of this are tobacco and firearms. In regard to tobacco,
Congress has not adopted any meaningful laws holding the tobacco manu-
facturers liable for providing a lethal product. Just the opposite is true.
Congress expressly provided that the Food and Drug Administration and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission lacked authority to deal with
the deadly aspects of tobacco.68 The most dangerous product in the world
is tobacco, and it would seem obvious that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission would have jurisdiction over tobacco, but the enabling act
expressly provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission lacks
such authority.
69
Congress and the state legislatures have also failed to deal with an-
other epidemic, handgun violence.7"' Although there are a large number
of regulations dealing with firearms, these are only window dressing and
deal with the mechanical details of firearms purchase and ownership.
7
'
Even the Brady Bill fails to deal with the major issue, which is the careless
saturation of the country with firearms. 72 In failing to address this epi-
67. See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (acknowledging argument made by plain-
tiffs that tobacco manufacturers had actual knowledge of lethal consequences of
smoking).
68. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142
(2000) (holding that Congress clearly intended to "exclude tobacco products from
the FDA's jurisdiction") (citing Consumer Product Safety Commission Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 3(c), 90 Stat. 503 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1261(0(2))). Congress has adopted legislation that eliminates the agency's
(Consumer Product Safety Commission) authority to regulate tobacco and tobacco
products. See Brown &Williamson 529 U.S. at 151 (denoting congressional action to
remove authority from CPSC).
69. See id. at 127-28 (finding that tobacco kills over three million people each
year, worldwide; 400,000 in United States alone).
70. See FrankJ. Vandall, Economic and Causation Issues in City Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 719, 719 (2000) [hereinafter Vandall, Gun Manufac-
turers] ("[T]he epidemic of [gun] violence has been largely ignored by American
society .. ").
71. See Frank J. Vandall, O.K. Corral II: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against
Gun Manufacturers, 44 VILL. L. REv. 547, 547-52 (1999) [hereinafter Vandall, O.K.
Corral] (chronicling deleterious effects of gun ownership).
72. See Brendan J. Healey, Plugging the Bullet Holes in U.S. Gun Law: An Ammu-
nition-Based Proposal For Tightening Gun Control, 32J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 21 (1998)
("Perhaps the biggest weakness in Brady is the ease with which it can be circum-
vented... Brady has a negligible effect on those who already own guns, those who
purchase their guns using a strawman, those who steal guns and those who
purchase guns on the secondary market."); see also James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A.
Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the "Wrong" Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regu-
lation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 104 (1995) ("Brady supporters may have
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demic, the United States Congress and state legislatures have tacitly ap-
proved the large number of violent and unnecessary deaths of children,
spouses and strangers.73 They have, through omission, substantially con-
tributed to the death of the inner cities, as claimed by Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, in its suit against the gun manufacturers.7 4
The almost complete control of the state legislatures by the gun lobby
is illustrated by the failure to respond to this epidemic and by the instanta-
neous reaction of the Georgia legislature in passing an act that forbids
cities to sue the manufacturers of firearms in products liability.7 5 At a
Pepperdine Law School symposium, a lawyer for the National Rifle Associ-
ation (NRA) was proud to state that while attending a gun convention in
Atlanta, NRA representatives were able to walk across the street and in-
stantly persuade the Georgia legislature to pass the above-mentioned pro-
hibitive legislation. 76
The Brady Bill is a step forward and has allegedly been successful in
preventing gun sales to more than 200,000 criminals, but its critical failure
is that it allows the sale of firearms to thousands of citizens every day. 77
This continues the clear and foreseeable danger of children obtaining
firearms and shooting other children or their parents, as well as spouses
using handguns to kill each other and the large number of shootings of
total strangers in the United States. At present, there are no cases that
hold a gun manufacturer liable for gun violence.78
underestimated the ease with which the regulatory scheme can be circumvented
and they may have overestimated the ability of government agencies to enforce
these regulations.").
73. See Vandall, Gun Manufacturers, supra note 70, at 719 (documenting mor-
tality rates due to gun violence).
74. See Vandall, O.K. Corral, supra note 71, at 549 ("The city of Bridgeport,
Connecticut, for example, is suing [gun manufacturers] for the cost of deteriora-
tion of the city."). Bridgeport ultimately lost in the courts. See Cincinnati Has a
Shot, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 18, 2002, at 8A (describing Bridgeport case).
75. See H.B. 189, 145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999) (reserving civil
action against gun manufacturers to state discretion). Only nine days after Atlanta
sued, the Georgia Legislature barred such suits. SeeVandall, O.K. Corral, supra note
71, at 556 (discovering efforts of gun manufacturers in lobby of Georgia legisla-
ture) (citing Kathy Pruitt, Blocking of Gun Suit Now Law, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb.
10, 1999, at BI).
76. See Vandall, Gun Manufacturers, supra note 70, at 722 n.53 (reporting that
Governor Roy Barnes signed bill into law blocking city of Atlanta's lawsuit against
gun manufacturers, potentially bringing end to legislative battle over right of any
local government to bring product liability suit against gun manufacturers) (citing
Kathy Pruitt, Blocking of Gun Suit Now Law, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 10, 1999, at
BI).
77. See Healey, supra note 72, at 21 (noting ability of gun holders to circum-
vent system); Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against The Gun Industry: A Comparative
InstitutionalAnalysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (2000) ("Illegal sales at the retail
level are quite common.").
78. For a further discussion of cases supporting the fact that no gun manufac-
turer has yet to be held liable for gun violence, see infra notes 103 and 107.
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The American Law Institute (ALl) has played a substantial role in
reducing justice for consumers over the past seven years. 79 This began
with the Enterprise Liability Project and the flawed Restatement (Third) Sec-
tion 2(b) of Products Liability in 1993. The most recent constrictive docu-
ment from the ALI is the Restatement (Third): Apportionment.80 This
position paper was recently critiqued. 8 1 The theme of the Restatement
(Third): Apportionment is that joint and several liability is flawed, and that
any approach is better than joint and several liability. The underlying the-
sis ofjoint and several liability is that if two defendants cause an indivisible
injury, each of these defendants can be held liable for the whole amount
of the injured consumer's damages.82 A recent case involving consumers
injured at Disney World caused the ALI to question the concept of joint
and several liability. 83 In Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood,84 a woman was
injured when her fiance ran into her in a bumper car while visiting Disney
World. She brought suit against Disney World for designing a defective
product and Disney World joined her fianc6 as a defendant.8 5 The plain-
tiff married her fiance, and because of spousal immunity, the husband was
dismissed from the suit. This meant under joint liability that although
Disney World was only one percent at fault, it was held liable for 85 per-
cent of the damages. 86 The Reporters for the Restatement (Third): Appor-
tionment present a five track system of apportionment implying that there
are five separate and equal approaches to the question of apportionment
of liability. 87 This track proposal by the Reporters represents a failure to
analyze precedent.88 In fact, joint and several liability is the predominant
79. See Vandall, Design, Defect, supra note 34, at 261 (describing Section 2(b) of
Restatement (Third) of Torts as "wish list" for manufacturing America).
80. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
(1999) (abandoning joint and several liability in favor of apportionment
approach).
81. See Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as it
Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY LJ. 565, 570 (2000) ("ALl has initiated a
massive fundamental change in the law of joint and several liability and
apportionment...").
82. See id. at 566-67 (describing application of joint and several liability).
83. See id. at 569-70 (characterizing ALI's approach to reform of joint and
several liability as "extreme overreaction").
84. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
85. See Wood, 515 So. 2d at 199 (discussing facts of case).
86. See id. at 202 (electing to retain doctrine ofjoint and several liability).
87. See Vandall, supra note 81, at 570-71 (enumerating track classifications).
Track A is joint and several liability; while Track B is complete rejection of joint
and several liability. See id. (describing tracks). Next, Track C "allows the plain-
tiff's recovery to be reduced merely because the judgment cannot be collected
from an insolvent defendant" and Track D "introduces a mathematical concept,
the threshold, which serves to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in certain cases." Id.
Finally, "Track E divides the plaintiff's damages into economic losses and pain and
suffering, with different standards of recovery for each." Id.
88. See id. ("The Reporters' radical approach allows them to criticize joint and
several liability without acknowledging the common law and underlying
policies.").
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rule and each one of the tracks proposed by the ALl is a distinct minority
rule."9 The states, when faced with a challenge to their concept of appor-
tionment, should look at their own precedent rather than the Restatement
(Third): Apportionment. It is an opinion piece by the authors, not a restate-
ment of the law.N" If a state adopts one of the ALI's proposed tracks, it will
further extend a modest products suit beyond the reach of the victim.
The risk created by the Restatement (Third): Apportionment is that if one
of the reform tracks is adopted, it will affect every aspect of a products
liability case: whether an attorney should take a case, whether he or she
should settle a case and if so for how much, whether following ajudgment
the plaintiff will be able to recover from joint defendants and if so how
much and in applying the concept of comparative fault, how much fault
will be allocated to the plaintiff. The conclusion that flows from reading
the Restatement (Third): Apportionment is that injured consumers will recover
less. The Restatement (Third): Apportionment will reduce the number of
modest suits by decreasing the chances that the plaintiff will recover a
meaningful verdict.
Several clearly wrong cases in the area of tobacco, firearms and alco-
hol have brought the expansion of products liability to a halt in these ar-
eas. Most importantly, the Cipollone cigarette case was wrongly decided by
the Supreme Court.9' In contrast to the holding, which stated that there
was express preemption of design defect, a strong argument could be
made that preemption (if any) was implied. 92 The tobacco manufacturers
should have been held accountable. The Supreme Court could have de-
cided the Cipollone case with vision rather than creating a technical quag-
mire. It should have held that with over 400,000 tobacco-caused deaths
each year, there was an unprecedented product-induced epidemic in the
United States, and the source of the epidemic was clear. It should have
concluded the disease was entirely unnecessary and that it was appropriate
to hold the cigarette manufacturers liable. The Cipollone case could have
been based on design defect, failure to warn or fraud. 9 3 The Supreme
Court should have acknowledged that over three million people, world-
wide, die needlessly and, accordingly, should have taken steps to reduce
this human carnage.
89. See id. at 619 (classifying approach of Reporters' as illogical minority rule).
90. See id. at 593 ("The purpose of a Restatement is to restate the common
law, not the statutoly law.").
91. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 504 (1992) (holding
that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not pre-empt state dam-
ages action).
92. See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186 (3d Cir. 1986) (deciding that state law dam-
age claims were pre-empted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
93. See Ray Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for
the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 81, 116-17 (1994) (examining various causes of action for tobacco
suits).
860 [Vol. 48: p. 843
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The area of firearms is another area where the courts have failed to
address the issue of a product-induced epidemic. This epidemic of fear,
injury and death exists because of the profusion of firearms in the United
States.9 4 The Perkins v. F.LE. Corp.15 case, also known as the Charter Arms,
case was wrongly decided in 1984.9}6 In that case a third year medical stu-
dent was mugged, raped and murdered with a small handgun. The dece-
dent's mother brought suit against Charter Arms, the manufacturer of the
handgun, and the lower court permitted recovery based on strict liabil-
ity.9 7 On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that strict liability did not apply to
the manufacturer of handguns because of the criminal superceding cause
and because every preceding case that applied strict liability had been re-
lated to property; a "Saturday Night Special" has no relationship to prop-
erty.9 8 The decision was wrong because the manufacturers foresaw the
criminal shootings and the court's restriction of strict liability to land was
tortured.
The wrongness of this handgun precedent has recently been ad-
dressed. The first important case is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek99 , a New York
case, against the manufacturers of handguns for the negligent over-satura-
tion of the South. 'I'l The theory was that the manufacturers knew that the
guns being sold in great numbers in the South were being transported to
New York and Chicago and sold on the black market.' 1 Several gun man-
ufacturers were held liable to one of the shooting victims in that case. 11 2
94. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Pri-
vate Ownership and Use of Firearms, U.S. DEPT. OF.JUS'riCE 13 (1997) (estimating that
there are 192 million firearms in hands of private American citizens and 65 million
of those firearms are handguns). More than one in three households have at least
one firearm and about one in four adults in America personally own a firearm. See
id.
95. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
96. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming lower court's grant
of summary judgment and stating that guns "fall [ ] far beyond the boundaries...
of Ultra hazardous activities").
97. See Richmand v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 204 (E.D. La.
1983) (permitting claim as ultra hazardous activity while prohibiting claim under
products liability).
98. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (holding that injury must "flow directly from
the activity itself alleged to be ultra hazardous").
99. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
100. See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1330 (claiming gun manufacturer's mar-
keted handguns such that they could easily be obtained illegally); see also Hamilton
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "availability of
the guns... was the relevant factor for the perpetrators and victims of shootings").
101. See Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 40 (contending that plaintiffs know their prod-
ucts entered "illegal market[s] and are used to commit crimes").
102. See id. at 40-41 (finding three defendant gtn manufacturers liable for
permanently disabled victim and his mother).
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Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals reversed Hamilton.1 3 It
held that no duty runs from the gun manufacturer to the victim.
The second important handgun case is Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.10 4 In
Merrill, a disgruntled client acquired numerous automatic weapons and
went to the office of his attorney, where he wantonly killed eight people
and injured many more. 10 5 The suit against the manufacturer of the
Tech-9, Navegar, argued that the manufacturer was negligent in market-
ing and promoting the gun because it knew of the rapid fire capacity of
the gun and advertised it in publications that would appeal to people who
would likely misuse the gun. The California Court of Appeals held the
Tech-9 manufacturer liable for negligent marketing.10 6 This decision has
since been reversed by the California Supreme Court.1°1 7 The Court held
that it did not matter whether the case was styled in negligence or strict
liability. The issue was covered by a California statute that forbid cost-
benefit analysis to be used in products suits against gun manufacturers.
The red flag for the product-caused epidemic of handgun violence is
being waved by numerous mayors throughout the country. The mayors
have brought suits against the gun manufacturers in order to recover for
the expenses paid by the cities to respond to the wave of gun violence.
The suits are in various stages of litigation and the gun manufacturers, at
present, are attempting to settle them.' 0 8 The goals of the suits are to
force the gun manufacturers to take cognizance of the saturation sales,
excess promotion of handguns and the fact that they have contributed to
the decline of the inner cities, and to hold the manufacturers financially
responsible. 109 These are not suits to ban guns, but rather to shift the loss,
as in the tobacco suits, to the manufacturers.
103. The New York Court of Appeals held that no duty runs from the gun
manufacturers to the victims. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222,
222 (N.Y. 2001) (certifying question against plaintiff).
104. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 152 (1999), cert. granted, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256
(2000).
105. See id. (laying out facts of case).
106. See id. at 163 ("Appellants have provided no persuasive reason to con-
clude that the exercise of care in distribution or marketing would be altogether
inefficacious in reducing the danger inherent in distributing the TEC-DC9.").
107. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 133 (Cal. 2001) (holding that
state law prevents gun manufacturer liability under these facts). The pro-gun stat-
ute relied on in Merill has recently been superceded by the California legislature.
108. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (asserting Ohio Products Liability Act, among other common law
claims, as cause of action against gun manufacturers); Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc.,
72 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (granting city's motion to remand in
action for injunctive relief and punitive damages against gun manufacturers).
109. See Tania Anderson, Mayor King Goes to Washington to Talk About Gun Set-
tlement, STATES NEWS SERV., January 25, 2000 (noting participation of Gary, Indiana
mayor in trip to Washington); Deirdre Shesgreen, Smith & Wesson Will Redesign
Guns, Marketing: 30 Cities, Countries Agree to Drop Their Lawsuits, ST. Louis POST Dis-
PATcH, March 18, 2000, at 19 (reporting on agreement that changes distribution,
production and marketing of guns).
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Finally, the third most dangerous product in the country is alco-
hol. 110 The consumption of alcohol is involved in almost every crime, nu-
merous vehicle crashes and deaths and a very large number of domestic
violence cases.'' Alcohol is, in part, responsible for large numbers of
people losing their jobs, becoming divorced and committing suicide.1 12
The courts have rejected cases brought by victims who have been injured
by alcohol, however. 1 1 3 One Texas case, brought by the mother of a col-
lege girl who died from drinking a large amount of tequila, held that the
manufacturers of alcohol had a duty to warn the young woman of the risk
of death from the excessive consumption of alcohol.' 14 Several years later
the Texas Supreme Court reversed, and held that the manufacturer of
alcohol had no duty to warn the consumer of the risk of death.' 15 The
rejection of these alcohol cases by the courts ignores the fact that very few
consumers understand the scope of the interaction of alcohol with the
human body. 1 6 The addictive nature of alcohol, its damage to the brain
10. See MADD: Costs of Alcohol-Related Crashes (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) at
http://www.korrnet.org/maddwdc/stats.html (citing statistics associated with alco-
hol use in America). The most dangerous product, however, is tobacco.
111. See Carter H. Dukes, Alcohol Manufacturers and the Duty to Warn: An Analy-
sis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, 38 EMORY
L.J. 1189, 1189 (1984) (citing H.R. 4441, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988) §1(3)) (stat-
ing that over twenty four thousand Americans die each year in traffic accidents
because of alcohol consumption).
112. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits, 664 S.W.2d 690, 693-94
(Tenn. 1984) (dismissing products liability action for death caused by ingestion of
grain alcohol).
113. See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982)
(affirming lower courts' dismissal and asserting no duty for alcohol distributors
and manufacturers to warn); Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., 1986 WL 760, at
*4 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Jan. 9, 1986) (affirming summary judgment for manufac-
turer and disallowing products liability cause of action); Azzarello v. Black Bros.
Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Pa. 1978) (imposing strict liability on manufacturer
of "unreasonably dangerous" machine); Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693 (stating that
manufacturer of grain alcohol does not have duty to adequately warn user of ap-
parent danger).
114. See Brune v. Brown Forman Corp. 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. App. 1988)
[hereinafter Brune 1], (reversing and remanding for determination as to whether
tequila "is safe ... without a warning").
115. See Brown Forman Corp. v. Brune 893 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Tex. App. 1994)
[hereinafter Brune I], (holding tequila distiller did not have duty to warn of safe
use of product).
116. See Natalie K. Chetlin, In Support of Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.: A Brewing
Debate Over Extending Liability to Manufacturers of Alcoholic Beverages, 51 U. Prr-r. L.
REV. 179, 180 (1989) (citing National Council of Alcoholism, A Case for Health
Warning Labels on Alcoholic Beverages, to point to national study which demonstrated
that even though ordinary consumer realizes that if he or she drinks large amounts
of alcohol over long period of time that he or she may become dependent or even
develop liver disease, he or she does not believe alcohol is dangerous if consumed
in moderation); Elizabeth L. Kruger, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards Through
Health Warning Labels and Public Education, 63 WASH. L. REV. 979, 979 (Oct. 1988)
(citing S. 9331.03, 99th Cong. (2d Sess. 1986), which states that Americans are
actually less aware of dangers of alcohol consumption than risk of smoking).
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and the impact of alcohol on the unborn fetus are also not well-under-
stood by consumers.' 17 There are, of course, many other risks associated
with alcohol that consumers do not understand.' 18 Merely because alco-
hol has been around forever and is well-known to be intoxicating and ad-
dictive, does not mean that all of the highly dangerous effects of alcohol
are well-known.' 1'[ One case, however, has held that a manufacturer must
give a warning of the risks of alcohol in causing pancreatitus.120
117. See Kruger, supra note 116, at 979 (noting lack of awareness by Ameri-
cans as to "dangers of alcohol").
118. See, e.g., McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 845
(Tex. App. 1991), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (outlining omissions on part
of manufacturers and distributors in failing to warn of dangers). The plaintiff pro-
vided a detailed list of omissions including:
1. Continued use or excess use of alcohol would cause cirrhosis of the
liver.
2. Alcohol is a drug.
3. Alcohol is a depressant.
4. Alcohol causes diseases of the stomach and duodenum.
5. Alcohol inhibits medical treatment.
6. Alcohol is toxic to the brain cells and tissues.
7. Alcohol is toxic to tissues of the stomach, liver and heart.
8. Drinking alcohol for pleasure or recreational purposes may lead to
psychological and physical dependency.
9. Alcohol compromises the immune system.
10. Some people are genetically predisposed to alcoholism.
11. Psychological and social factors may predispose a person to alcoholism.
12. Alcohol is harmful to health.
13. Over two (2) drinks per day is harmful to health.
14. They failed to warn of the signs and symptoms of alcoholism.
15. They failed to instruct on the symptoms of alcoholism.
16. They failed to instruct on safe use of the drug.
17. They failed to warn that alcoholism causes marital discord, family
problems and financial problems.
18. They failed to warn that alcoholism will deteriorate or destroy conjugal
relations.
19. They failed to warn that alcoholism is a lifetime disease and that recovery
is impossible.
20. That "denial" prohibits addicts from recognizing an addiction and re-
ceiving treatment.
21. That treatment of the addiction is very costly and beyond the economic
means of most alcohol addicts.
22. They failed to warn of the latent, hidden and concealed hazards, defects
and dangerous effects of the drug alcohol.
23. They failed to warn Ronald McGuire's family and friends of the signs and
symptoms of alcoholis [sic].
24. They failed to instruct Ronald McGtire, his family and friends to en-
courage him to seek help at the first symptoms of alcoholism.
Id.
119. See id. at 850 (noting that although some dangers are known, extent of
associated diseases are not "commonly known").
120. See Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 515.
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III. PROCEDURAL RETRENCHMENTS: THE PRESENTATION OF THE
PRODUCTS CASE IN THE COURTROOM
The purpose of this part is to manifest that various recent modifica-
tions in the law related to discovery, the presentation of evidence, punitive
damages and the need for an expert witness have helped to bring about a
dramatic increase in the costs of litigating a products liability case.
One of the most costly developments in the litigation of a products
liability case is the almost absolute requirement that in every case an ex-
pert will be required. 12 1 This was made crystal clear, by the Supreme
Court, in the 1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.12 2 Daubert
involved Bendectin, which was a calmative given to pregnant women.123
The mothers of children who were born with congenital birth defects
brought suits, alleging that these birth defects were caused by the adminis-
tration of Bendectin, during the period when the limbs were being
formed in the fetus. 124 The children displayed missing and shortened
limbs, as well as incomplete neurological development in some cases. 125
After many years of intermediate appeals, the Supreme Court held that
the trial judge was the gatekeeper and had the power to evaluate the cre-
dentials of the expert witness, as well as whether his or her testimony
would be of value to the jury. 12 6 Following Daubert, numerous cases re-
jected the plaintiffs proposed expert witness. 1'2 7 Some assumed that
Daubert was limited to scientific and technological cases and would not be
applied to non-technical cases.12 8
This flawed assumption was corrected by the United States Supreme
Court in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.129 In 1999, the Supreme Court
held that Daubert applied to non-technical cases.'13 In Kumho, a tire on a
minivan had exploded and the plaintiff's expert testified that the tire was
defectively designed. The Court held that the gatekeeper function of the
trial court applied to non-scientific testimony and that the trial court
121. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-623 (1997) (requiring certificate of
merit from expert in all product liability actions). This statute was held unconsti-
tutional by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
122. 509 U.S. 579, 584 (1993) (establishing standards for expert witness testi-
mony admittance).
123. See id. at 582 (explaining use of Bendectin)
124. See id. (discussing Bendectin as potential teratogen).
125. See id. (listing various birth defects).
126. See id. (holding that trial judge must determine whether expert's reason-
ing or methodology is valid and can be applied to facts at hand).
127. See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 457 (2000) (holding that
court may exclude "erroneously admitted" evidence through exclusion of experts).
128. But see Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999)
(explaining trial judges' "gate keeping" duties).
129. See id. at 152 (granting trial court increased "latitude in deciding how to
test an expert's reliability").
130. See id. at 151 (declining to limit standards for experts to scientific or
technical fields).
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could reject the expert witness on the basis that he or she was insufficiently
trained or experienced.1 ' The significance of the Kumho decision is that
the expert witness requirement now applies to all cases, scientific as well as
non-scientific.' 3 2 Daubert, in conjunction with Kumho, stands for the idea
that the plaintiffs expert will be carefully scrutinized in all products cases.
The impact on a products case is that the price of a lawsuit has increased
by the cost of the expert witness and his or her preparation for trial. As-
suming that the cost of an expert is approximately $25,000, Daubert and
Kumho have arguably increased the cost of presenting a products case by
this amount.
One critical development that has constricted the litigation of prod-
ucts liability cases is the broad refusal by the courts to accept the class
action concept embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 133 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.' 3 4
As illustrated by the language of the rule, small but numerous prod-
ucts liability cases fit the test precisely. For instance, the most obvious
product for a class action suit is tobacco.1' 5 The injured smoker should be
able to join with other injured smokers, as a class, and sue the tobacco
manufacturers. 36 Tobacco naturally meets the requirements of a class ac-
tion 1 3 7 because there are many victims and common facts.1 38 The numer-
ous victims all smoked cigarettes for varying periods of time and all
131. See id. at 153 (allowing expert to be rejected based on methodology em-
ployed when making decisions and/or qualifications).
132. See id. (providing example of expert witness requirement being applied
in non-scientific manner).
133. See Martin L.C. Feldman, Predominance and Products Liability Class Actions:
An Idea of Whose Time Has Passed?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1621, 1627 (2000) (exploring
fact that courts have cautioned that it is necessary to strictly adhere to require-
ments of class certification under Federal Rules).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (setting forth requirements for class actions in or-
der to ensure fair and adequate representation for all parties).
135. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 554, 554-56 (E.D. La. 1995)
(recognizing that class actions provide suitable forum for litigation against tobacco
industry).
136. See id. at 554 (noting that plaintiffs must have sustained similar injuries to
bring class action suit).
137. See id. at 555 (indicating unique nature of product makes tobacco ame-
nable to class action).
138. See id. (acknowledging that large numbers of victims and similarity of
facts are requisites to class action suits).
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developed the same four diseases. The same product-tobacco-was in-
volved,' 39 and each smoker contracted one of four forms of cancer and is
seriously injured or has died. 14° This was the basis of a recent Louisiana
class action where the lower court certified the class by holding that the
class action provision applied to cigarette smokers.14 ' The district court
certification was rejected by the Federal Court of Appeals. Judge Smith,
quoting Judge Posner, wrote:
One Jury ... will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its
hand . . . That kind of thing can happen in our system of civil
justice ... But it need not be tolerated when the alternative exists
of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggre-
gate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers.
That would not be a feasible option if the stakes to each class
member were too slight to repay the cost of suit... But this is not
the case . . . Each plaintiff if successful is apt to receive a judg-
ment in the millions. With the aggregate stakes in the tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars, or even in the billions, it is not a
waste ofjudicial resources to conduct more than one trial, before
more than six jurors .... 142
What he means by this is clear. Judge Smith means that it is appropriate
for an American corporation to take over 400,000 lives a year (over three
million world-wide), but it is not appropriate for the consumers who are
injured or killed to take these tobacco manufacturers to court in order to
shift the loss, raise the price and deter the manufacture of such a
product. 143
One exception to the historical cigarette class action prohibition is
the recent case in Florida, brought by numerous airline stewardesses, who
argued that the smoke in the airplanes caused lung cancer for the steward-
esses, none of whom smoked. 14 4 The court certified the stewardesses as a
class, and they have recovered a small amount. Perhaps the court was mo-
tivated to certify the class because the stewardesses had agreed to reject
damages based on their physical injury, and instead would only accept pu-
nitive damages and those would go toward research and prevention. 145
139. See id. (citing common injury cause of action as cigarette addiction).
140. See id. at 548 (noting that smoker must have suffered serious injury or
death to be in class and recognizing that widow of smoker may serve as plaintiff).
141. See id. at 561 (certifying class action pursuant to Federal Rules 23(b) and
23(c)(4)).
142. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting
directly from Judge Posner's decision regarding fee or loss shifting).
143. See id. at 752 (reversing and remanding district court's decision to certify
class with instructions that district court dismiss class complaint).
144. See Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888, 892 (Fla. App. 1994)
(reasserting class action allegations).
145. See John Pacenti, Night Attendants Seek Approval of $349 Million, Assoc.
PRESS, Jan. 26, 1998, at 1-2, available in 1998 WL 7379727 (reporting settlement
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Another class action brought by thousands of Florida smokers reached a
jury verdict of 145 billion dollars in the summer of 2000.14 The lawsuit
was brought on behalf of 500,000 Floridians against five of the nation's
largest cigarette manufacturers.14 7 The suit was brought by a Miami pedi-
atrician who stated that smoking was the cause of his emphysema. The
tobacco manufacturers responded to those claims by stating that no scien-
tific proof exists that smoking causes any particular illness and that the
public is well aware that smoking is risky. The jury, however, rejected the
industry's claims and found for the smokers on all counts.
14 8
One of the most important factors affecting the cost of litigating a
products liability suit is the wealth of the defendant. 49 Most products
liability suits involve defendants who are large American or foreign corpo-
rations. No suit against such a defendant is going to be inexpensive.15() A
preferred tactic used by well-asseted opponents is to force the victim to
spend large amounts of money in litigation.'-' The defendant manufac-
turer forces the plaintiff's attorney to spend a huge amount in prosecuting
the case.' 52 Perhaps the best example of this is the Cipollone tobacco case,
where it is estimated that the plaintiff's attorney spent approximately six
million dollars presenting the case.' 153 In Cipollone, it became clear that
the defendants' goal was to "paper the plaintiff to death.""54 The defend-
ants used the discovery process to drag-out the case and increase the cost
of litigation. 155 Large corporate defendants often adopt the posture that
that called for $300 million for medical research and $49 million for legal fees and
expenses).
146. See News Service Wire, Re B&WStatement, REG. NEWS SERv.,July 17, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 24184584 (reporting thatjury award was ten times net worth
of companies being sued).
147. The suit was brought against R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Loril-
lard Tobacco, Philip Morris and Ligget Group, Inc. See id. (referring to defendants
in case).
148. See id. (relating that jury's decision was exclusively in favor of class of
smokers and included total judgment of $272.11 billion against tobacco
companies).
149. See Bogus, supra note 63, at 57 (discussing barriers to tobacco suits).
150. See id. (noting many tactical weapons used by large corporate defendants
in product liability cases).
151. See id. (recognizing that financial burdens of litigation may prevent
plaintiffs from bringing and sustaining suits).
152. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 506 (1992) (ac-
knowledging some obstacles that may be present in class actions brought against
large corporations).
153. See id. (providing example of how timely and expensive product liability
cases can be).
154. See id. (setting forth types of strategic delays defendants in product liabil-
ity cases may employ); see also Bogus, supra note 63, at 58 (noting that exhaustion is
powerful weapon for large corporate defendants).
155. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 506 (recognizing that over nine years of litiga-
tion had passed since original complaint had been filed).
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the victim must "prove everything," which is enormously expensive.1 56
These tactics were victorious in Cipollone because, after the plaintiff died,
her husband died and the surviving son voluntarily discontinued the
case. 1 57 This dismissal followed multiple federal Cipollone cases, including
two before the Supreme Court.' 58
During the past twenty years numerous states have adopted statutes of
repose.' 59 Under these statutes the cause of action may expire before it
occurs. 160 Statutes of repose provide that there is a certain time period
after the date of sale of the product within which the cause of action must
be brought.1 6 1 For example, some provide that the claim must be filed
within ten years of the sale of the product. If the injury occurs twelve years
after the sale of the product, there is no cause of action because the stat-
ute of repose has run. These statutes have been challenged on the basis
they violate the equal protection clause and the access to court provisions
of the state constitutions.' 62 Fortunately the statutes of repose are only
important in a small number of cases-those relating to heavy equipment
such as bulldozers and presses, which last for more than ten years-and
have little effect on most consumer products, which generally cause injury
within the first three years of ownership. 163
Protracted discovery in products cases has helped to expand the cost
of litigation. A recent article by Professors George Shepherd and Morgan
Cloud argues that discovery is the reason for the explosion in the costs of
156. See Elizabeth Gleick, Tobacco Blues: The Tobacco Industry Has Never Lost a
Lawsuit but a New Billion Dollar Legal Assault and a High-Ranking Defector May Change
That, TIME, Mar. 11, 1996, at 54 (noting that Liggett Group has already spent $75
million defending lawsuit and was prepared to spend even more).
157. See Bogus, supra note 63, at 58 (quoting Henry J. Reske, Cigarette Suit
Dropped, A.B.AJ., Feb. 1993, at 30 and noting that, after death of parents, neither
son nor attorneys "wanted to continue the fight").
158. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 506 (providing history of case). A Florida
attorney, Woody Wilner, has discovered a way to dramatically reduce the costs of
litigating a tobacco suit; he does not attend the tobacco manufacturers depositions
of the plaintiff. See Howard Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implication of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Law Suits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 390
(2000) (noting strategies employed by successful plaintiff's attorney).
159. See Berry ex. rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah
1985) (commenting that "[a] number of states have enacted ... statutes of re-
pose"). But see Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1003 (Ala.
1982) (striking down statute as being "arbitrary and capricious").
160. See Vandall, supra note 31, at 680 (noting harshness of criminal rile).
161. See id. (examining procedural complexities of statute of repose
requirements).
162. See Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1001 (challenging statute under Alabama's
equal protection clause); see also Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195,
197 (R.I. 1984) (examining challenge of statute Linder state and federal equal pro-
tection grounds).
163. See Vandall, supra note 31, at 682-83 (discussing radical changes caused
by statute of repose).
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litigating all cases-including products cases. 164 The authors reason that,
since it is risky for either side to avoid lengthy discovery, many cases have
now become prohibitively expensive. 165 They conclude that discovery has
"weighted the scales of justice against some of society's most vulnerable
groups" and that this increased financial burden of discovery has made
litigation unaffordable for many people.166
The plaintiff in a products liability suit must face the risk that if he or
she is successful in winning punitive damages, large portions of the award
may be taken away from him or her. In a recent case, BMW v. Gore,' 6 7
involving fraud on the part of BMW in failing to inform consumers that
the manufacturer had repainted portions of brand-new BMWs, the plain-
tiff recovered a two million dollar punitive damage award in the state
court. 168 On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that the award
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 69 In deciding whether a punitive
damage award is excessive and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court will look at three factors. 1 711 One is the nature of the injury. 17 1
Is it based on economic loss or personal injury? The value of the BMW
was decreased because of the new paint job. This is an economic loss.
Because many products liability cases involve personal injury, a victim may
be able to argue that the holding in BMW, resting on economic loss, does
not apply. The second factor to be considered by the Court in deciding
whether the punitive award is excessive is the ratio of punitive damages to
out-of-pocket losses. ' 72 The Court suggested that a ratio of four to one, or
perhaps in extreme cases ten to one, might be appropriate, but anything
larger is suspect. 173 Finally, the Court suggested that the amount of puni-
tive damages should bear some relationship to the criminal penalty for
that type of conduct, and in the BMWcase the most that could be awarded
164. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, 77ime and Money: Discovery
Leads to Hourly Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 126-29 (examining transformations
in legal proceedings due to discovery rules).
165. See id. at 98 (theorizing that uncertainty of discovery costs has increased
stakes and forced litigants to cover all bases).
166. Id. (postulating that rising cost of discovery effectively precludes poorer
segments from suits).
167. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
168. See id. at 568-71 (imposing punitive damages to further states' legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring repetition).
169. See id. at 573-75 (stating punitive damages may not be "granted dispro-
portionate [ly]" under Fourteenth Amendment).
170. See id. at 576-85 (defining generally three aggravating factors that must
be present for punitive damages award).
171. See id. at 575 (stating that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others").
172. See id. at 580-81 (declaring that "exemplary damages must bear a reason-
able relationship to compensating damages").
173. See id. (endorsing various "reasonable" ratios).
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as a fine was $10,000.174 Recent cases suggest that BMW will not be ap-
plied to products cases. 1
75
Several states including Georgia, have statutes that return a large per-
centage of the punitive damages obtained in a products liability case to the
state. 1 7 6 The Georgia statute provides that 75% of the punitive damage
award goes to the state rather than the victim. 1 7 7 Instead of slapping the
hands of the defendant for producing a defective product that maims or
kills, the hands of the victim's attorney are slapped for obtaining justice
for his or her client. The message from the legislature to Georgia attor-
neys is clear: Do not take products cases, do not represent injured
consumers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Numerous factors affect the calculations by the plaintiff's attorney in
deciding whether to accept a products case. The impact of the theoretical
and procedural reforms since 1980 is that the plaintiff's attorney will likely
refuse to accept many modest products liability cases because he or she
believes he or she will lose the case or that if he or she wins, the victory will
not cover his or her out-of-pocket expenses. There are several possible
solutions to this virtual closing of the courthouse doors to modest prod-
ucts cases.
First, follow the "superfund" model for toxic spills and assess the cor-
porations that produce the largest amount of recurring damage and the
most severe losses in products cases. The money would be used to fund a
program that would provide justice in modest products cases. 178 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA) has become widely referred to as "superfund" because
it "establishes a multi-billion dollar 'hazardous substance response trust
fund"' as a means of financing governmental cleanups of hazardous chem-
ical waste spills and sites. 179 CERCLA is funded in part by the govern-
174. See id. at 582-83 (rejecting impulse for categorical approach but preclud-
ing awards which "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow").
175. See Philip Morris v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45, 50-51 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting ap-
plication of BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)); see also Cooper
Indus. v. Leatherman, 532 U.S. 424, 429 (2001) (rejecting argument that punitive
damages were grossly excessive).
176. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2) (2002) (stating "seventy-five percent
of ... punitive damages, less ... costs ... shall be paid into" state's treasury).
177. See id. (stating Georgia law with respect to punitive damages).
178. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(11), 9604 (Dec. 11, 1980) (establishing "trust
fund" for receipt of penalties); 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Dec. 11, 1980) (delineating pow-
ers and functions of "Hazard Substance Superfund"); see also United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1998) (noting CERCLA holds responsible parties
who polluted).
179. Douglas F. Brennan, Joint and Several Liability for Generators Under
Superfund: A Federal Formulafor Cost Recovery, 5 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 101, 105-
06 (1986) (citing CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9631) (stating CERCLA allows remedial
and abatement actions).
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ment's ability to recover the costs of any response or remedial actions
taken when there is an actual or threatened release of a hazardous or toxic
substance at a disposal site. CERCLA, under section 107(a), allows the
government to name as parties to the cleanup, the owner or operator of
the facility, the persons who arranged for the disposal, the persons in
charge of the treatment or transportation of the toxic materials and the
transporters of such hazardous wastes.' 8 0 This provision places ultimate
liability on the chemical manufacturers.' 8 ' Congress, through CERCLA,
has provided a means by which the financial burdens of hazardous waste
cleanups rest on the responsible chemical industry.182
The second approach might be modeled after the "Black Lung" act,
which reimburses expenses for coal miners who have developed black
lung disease.'18 3 The trigger for payment is a certification by a doctor that
the damage the miner suffered was caused by inhalation of coal dust. 184
The purpose of the "Black Lung" act of 1972 is to provide compensation
for claimants who became disabled due to pneumoconiosis contracted
while mining.185 The act requires proof of three things for a claimant to
recover: first, the claimant must prove disease or pneumoconiosis; 18 6 sec-
ond, causation; 187 and third, total disability, defined as an inability to en-
gage in coal mine employment, or its functional equivalent, caused by
pneumoconiosis.' 8I The "Black Lung" act suggests that there could be a
legislatively developed threshold and compensation for modest products
injuries.
180. See id. (citing United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 842,
845 (S.D. Il. 1984)) (restating test of liability); see also United States v. Ward, 618 F.
Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (providing interpretation of CERCLA statute).
The general test for whether a defendant is liable under section 107(a) is whether
the defendant(s) decided to put the waste into the hands of a facility that contains
hazardous wastes. See Id. (acknowledging CERCLA statute to hold generators of
hazardous waste strictly liable for disposal of by-products).
181. See Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982))
(stating that generators of hazardous material cannot escape liability by disregard-
ing method by which their products were disposed).
182. See id. (citing United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp.
1252 (D.C. Il. 1984)) (holding that liability cannot be avoided by characterizing
transaction as sale).
183. See William S. Mattingly, Blacklung Update: The Evolution of the Current Reg-
ulations and the Proposed Revolution, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 601, 602 (1998) (discussing
recent changes and interpretations of Black Lung Benefit Acts).
184. See Timothy F. Cogan, Is the Doctor Hostile? Obstructive Impairments and the
Hostility Rule in Federal Black Lung Claims, 97 W. VA. L. R1,-v. 1003, 1006 (1995)
(explaining that to be covered under Black Lung Act claimant must show that
inability to perform coal mine employment was due to pneumoconiosis).
185. See 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1988 and Supp. V 1993) (noting purpose and intent
of Black Lung Benefits Act).
186. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 114 (1988) (paraphras-
ing statute).
187. See id. (providing that detrimental condition must have been caused by
coal mine employment).
188. See id. (stating definition of total diability).
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A third possible solution is to enact a special victim-of-products court,
that would provide simplified procedures such as limitations on discovery
and a restriction on damages to less than $100,000. This could be
modeled after the popular small claims courts. 189 These courts developed
in the early 1900s in response to the expense and insufficiencies of the
regular courts. 190 Proponents of the movement believed that a society
should have an accessible and effective forum for asserting legal rights.
The formal procedures in the regular courts were often unreasonably time
consuming and expensive. 19 ' Thus, the courthouse doors were often
closed to many injured persons. 192
Small claims courts were developed to solve these problems by open-
ing the courthouse doors to the injured citizen. 19 3 These courts serve
three purposes: "(1) fair resolution of civil disputes; (2) deterrence of vio-
lent self-help by disputants; and (3) identification of recurring social
problems that might be proper subjects for legislative or administrative
action. '194 Small claims courts do not require the parties to have legal
expertise.' 9 5 Claimants are able to resolve their legal problems for a small
fee in a trial that lasts a few minutes.' 9 6 Many of the procedures and de-
tails of the small claims court would have to be redesigned for products
cases, of course.
The conclusion is inescapable that the multi-faceted tort reforms over
the last twenty years have been extremely successful.' 7 The constrictions
in tort theory and civil procedure have left victims with substantial, but not
189. See, e.g., CA. Civ. PRO. CODE § 116.120 (West 2003) (providing general
provisions on small claims divisions); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-401 (West
2002) (setting forth procedures and requirements of small claims divisions).
190. See Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claims Courts: A
Case Study, 21 FORDFLAM URB. L.J. 343, 346 (1994) (describing Colorado small
claims court).
191. See id. at 347 (citing Roscoe Pound, Administration ofJustice in the Modern
City, 26 HARv. L. REV. 302 (1913)) (advocating heightened accessibility of courts to
promote social justice).
192. Best et al., supra note 190, at 347 (citing Eric H. Steele, The Historical
Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 Am. B. FOUND. REs.J. 293) (providing that court
formalities cause difficulty in litigants' use of court system to collect small debts
without use of attorneys, thus increasing cost of litigation).
193. See Best et al., supra note 190, at 347 (intending small claims court to be
solution which created greater access to court system).
194. See id. at 344 (discussing function of small claims court).
195. See id. (citing ARTHUR BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN 10 (1981))
(recognizing that small claims courts serve valuable purpose by not requiring peti-
tioners to have legal expertise).
196. See Best et al., supra note 190, at 349 (citing Committee Hearings on S.B.
52 before Senate Committee on Judiciary (Feb. 9, 1976)).
197. There never was a demonstrated need for these retrenchments and re-
forms. See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in
Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627, 654 (1996) (pointing to
success of Georgia's multifaceted tort reforms); see also Mark Curriden, Juries on
Trial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, (acknowledging effect of tort reform
on juries).
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litigable, damages with no forum for relief. It has resulted in huge wind-
fall profits for manufacturers to the extent of injuries multiplied by the
number of occurrences. A solution for the millennium is needed that will
provide a venue to compensate the injured consumers and deter the man-
ufacture of defective products.
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